| Among the most important foreign policy | | | | |
| priorities likely to face the next U.S. | | | | ...It is [a] world in which there is one |
| President will be the task of rebuilding the | | | | master, one sovereign. And at the end of the |
| eroding U.S.-Russia relationship. Russia is | | | | day this is pernicious not only for all those |
| currently engaged in a policy of employing | | | | within this system, but also for the |
| its diplomatic leverage to "counterbalance" | | | | sovereign itself because it destroys itself |
| the United States. In the future, if the | | | | from within... |
| diminishing relationship is not repaired, | | | | |
| Russia could well begin to put its hard power | | | | I consider that the unipolar model is not |
| into play, as well. Such a development would | | | | only unacceptable but also impossible in |
| diminish the United States' ability to | | | | today's world. And this is not only because |
| safeguard and advance its critical global | | | | if there was individual leadership in |
| interests at a time when it has suffered a | | | | today's-and precisely in today's-world, then |
| major loss of credibility at enormous cost in | | | | the military, political and economic |
| the wake of its decision to go to war in | | | | resources would not suffice. What is even |
| Iraq. The challenge of bringing about an | | | | more important is that the model itself is |
| improved relationship is still a manageable | | | | flawed because at its basis there is and can |
| one. However, if the United States is to have | | | | be no moral foundations for modern |
| a reasonable chance at success, it will need | | | | civilization. |
| to understand Russia's concerns with regard | | | | |
| to American unilateralism and make | | | | Along with this, what is happening in today's |
| appropriate policy changes that limit its | | | | world...is a tentative to introduce precisely |
| unilateralism to situations where | | | | this concept into international affairs, the |
| unilateralist approaches are truly necessary. | | | | concept of a unipolar world. |
| | | | |
| In the post-Cold War world, fears the | | | | And with which results? |
| consequences of state failure and instability | | | | |
| on its expansive frontier. Clifford Gaddy and | | | | Unilateral and frequently illegitimate |
| Fiona Hill of The Brookings Institution | | | | actions have not resolved any problems. |
| explained, "Given its location in a volatile | | | | Moreover they have caused new human tragedies |
| neighborhood encompassing Central Asia, the | | | | and created new centers of tension. Judge for |
| Middle East and Northeast Asia, and including | | | | yourselves: wars as well as local and |
| several states on a potential collision | | | | regional conflicts have not diminished... |
| course with the United States-Iraq, Iran, | | | | |
| China, and North Korea-Russia is extremely | | | | Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained |
| vulnerable to the unintended consequences of | | | | hyper use of force-military force-in |
| U.S. action. A unilateralist approach on the | | | | international relations, force that is |
| part of the United States, Putin believes | | | | plunging the world into an abyss of permanent |
| could prove disastrous for Russia." | | | | conflicts. As a result we do not have |
| | | | sufficient strength to find a comprehensive |
| The still fairly recent and aggressive turn | | | | solution to any one of these conflicts |
| to unilateralism by the United States was | | | | Finding a political settlement also becomes |
| driven by perceptions of a new global reality | | | | impossible. |
| that followed the end of the Cold War. When | | | | |
| the Cold War concluded, the Soviet Union was | | | | Putin explicitly blamed the United States for |
| in the last days of its life (soon afterward, | | | | such developments. "One state and, of course, |
| it fractured into a number of economically | | | | first and foremost the United States, has |
| and politically weak successor states). At | | | | overstepped its national borders in every |
| that time, the U.S. appeared to have gained | | | | way," he charged, "This is visible in the |
| primacy in world affairs, especially in the | | | | economic, political, cultural and educational |
| eyes of an emerging Neoconservative school of | | | | policies it imposes on other nations." A |
| foreign policy thought that was beginning to | | | | full-fledged rupture in U.S.-Russia relations |
| diverge from the pragmatic Realism that had | | | | is still avoidable. In fact, the relationship |
| predominated through the end of the Cold War. | | | | can still be repaired fairly easily, as |
| In their view, a "multipolar" world had been | | | | unilateralism, and not a clash of critical |
| replaced by a "Unipolar" one. "The center | | | | interests between the two nations, is at the |
| of world power is an unchallenged superpower, | | | | root of the worsening relationship. A |
| the United States, attended by its Western | | | | pragmatic, interest-driven U.S. foreign |
| allies," leading Neoconservative thinker | | | | policy that restores primacy to diplomacy, |
| Charles Krauthammer wrote. He added, "There | | | | eliminates idealistic "Regime Change," and |
| is today no lack of second-rank powers. | | | | returns emphasis to relations between allies |
| Germany and Japan are economic dynamos. | | | | and great powers can overturn the |
| Britain and France can deploy diplomatic and | | | | unilateralism that is currently harming the |
| to some extent military assets. The Soviet | | | | relationship. Specifically, such a policy |
| Union possesses several elements of | | | | would entail among the following features: |
| power-military, diplomatic and political-but | | | | |
| all are in rapid decline. There is but one | | | | - A negotiated energy pact in which the |
| first-rate power and no prospect in the | | | | United States and Russia would ensure |
| immediate future of any power to rival it." | | | | cooperation with regard to Central Asia's |
| The Soviet Union, according to Krauthammer, | | | | energy resources and bring an end to the |
| had become nothing more than a "second-rank" | | | | emerging energy rivalry now evolving. In the |
| power and one that was in "rapid decline" to | | | | partnership, both nations would embrace the |
| boot. | | | | principle of open access and collaborate to |
| | | | address issues that might arise. Neither |
| Russia was humiliated. At the same time, it | | | | would make unilateral decisions that would |
| was constrained by its major weakness. | | | | undermine the core interests of the other. |
| Emboldened by the march of world events, | | | | |
| Neoconservative thinkers believed that the | | | | - Full support for Russia's fight against |
| new "Unipolar" world made U.S. consideration | | | | terrorism in its semi-autonomous Chechen |
| of the major interests of the world's other | | | | region and elimination of demands that Russia |
| great powers relatively less important than | | | | to negotiate with the Chechen terrorists. |
| in it was past. Under such an assumption, | | | | Such calls are unreasonable and have angered |
| they advocated an increasingly assertive | | | | Russia's government. In the aftermath of the |
| unilateral approach to U.S. foreign policy | | | | Beslan massacre-Russia's 9/11-Putin blasted |
| toward creating a safer world. | | | | U.S. calls for negotiations angrily |
| | | | exclaiming, "Why don't you meet Osama Bin |
| In stark contrast, Russia saw unilateralism | | | | Laden, invite him to Brussels or to the White |
| as hazardous to international peace and | | | | House and engage in talks..." |
| security. Today, Russia continues to believe | | | | |
| that single-power hegemony and a | | | | - Full NATO membership and responsibilities |
| unilateralist approach to foreign policy are | | | | and authority within the relationship that |
| dangerous and destabilizing. Consequently, it | | | | would be commensurate with its role as a |
| views U.S. unilateralism as posing a threat | | | | great power. Until that happens, no missiles |
| to its critical interests and wellbeing. | | | | or missile defense systems would be placed in |
| | | | countries that constitute Russia's "Near |
| Toward that end, Russian President Vladimir | | | | Abroad." The existing NATO guarantee of |
| Putin has consistently spoken out on those | | | | collective security would be maintained. At |
| issues. On May 8, 2001, he declared that | | | | the same time, Russia would commit to working |
| "claims to world domination...still are the | | | | with the U.S. and NATO to help mitigate |
| cause of many wars" and that "these sorts of | | | | missile threats or, if necessary, help |
| claims still linger on today and this is very | | | | contain the countries against which the |
| dangerous." A day later, he added, "Our | | | | anti-missile system is intended to afford |
| entire post-war [post-World War II] history | | | | protection. |
| teaches us that no country can build a safer | | | | |
| world for itself alone, and even more so, | | | | - A free trade agreement to more closely |
| cannot build its security to the detriment of | | | | integrate Russia into the global and western |
| others." | | | | economies. Such a mutually beneficial |
| | | | interdependence could mitigate Russian |
| Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a | | | | "counterbalancing." |
| wholly Neoconservative approach to foreign | | | | |
| policy blossomed in the U.S. Unilateralism | | | | - Restoration of a military doctrine of |
| became arguably the major means by which the | | | | pre-emption as opposed to proactive war. |
| U.S. conducted its relations with the | | | | Proactive war, particularly in the absence of |
| international community. "Regime Change" | | | | a credible and imminent threat to nation's |
| replaced "Containment" and "proactive war" | | | | critical interests, undermines respect for |
| replaced "pre-emption." In June 2002, the | | | | the norms of international law and increases |
| U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. In March | | | | instability in the region in which such |
| 2003, it invaded Iraq in the face of strong | | | | conflicts occur. Application of military |
| Russian opposition and in the absence of a | | | | force before diplomacy has been exhausted |
| United Nations Security Council resolution. | | | | makes it more difficult for nation's to |
| Currently, it is pursuing plans to place 10 | | | | achieve differences in the diplomatic arena, |
| missile interceptors in Poland and a radar | | | | as countries would more than likely focus on |
| system in the Czech Republic to construct a | | | | deterring an attack that could occur before |
| limited missile defense shield against | | | | meaningful negotiations had a chance to find |
| countries such as Iran. Russian alarm grew. | | | | agreement. |
| | | | |
| On February 10, 2007, President Putin made a | | | | None of these policies would compromise |
| seminal speech that detailed his objections | | | | critical U.S. interests. None of these |
| to the Neoconservatives' "Unipolar" vision | | | | policies would harm to U.S. national |
| and U.S. uniltateralism. Excerpts from | | | | security. Instead, they would create a |
| Putin's speech at the Munich Conference on | | | | post-unilateralist framework under which the |
| Security Policy detail his views and follow: | | | | geopolitically important U.S.-Russia |
| | | | relationship could be renewed and improved. |
| The history of humanity certainly has gone | | | | Such a development would be |
| through unipolar periods and seen aspirations | | | | mutually-beneficial to both countries and |
| to world supremacy. And what hasn't happened | | | | could, over time, be a force for increased |
| in world history? | | | | stability in parts of the world where |
| | | | stability is currently difficult to achieve. |
| However, what is a unipolar world? | | | | |