| Among the most important foreign policy
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| | The history of humanity certainly has
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| priorities likely to face the next U.S.
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| | gone through unipolar periods and seen
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| President will be the task of rebuilding
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| | aspirations to world supremacy. And what
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| the eroding U.S.-Russia relationship.
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| | hasn't happened in world history?
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| Russia is currently engaged in a policy
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| | However, what is a unipolar world?
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| of employing its diplomatic leverage to
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| | ...It is [a] world in which there is one
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| "counterbalance" the United States. In
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| | master, one sovereign. And at the end of
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| the future, if the diminishing
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| | the day this is pernicious not only for
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| relationship is not repaired, Russia
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| | all those within this system, but also
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| could well begin to put its hard power
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| | for the sovereign itself because it
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| into play, as well. Such a development
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| | destroys itself from within...
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| would diminish the United States' ability
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| | I consider that the unipolar model is not
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| to safeguard and advance its critical
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| | only unacceptable but also impossible in
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| global interests at a time when it has
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| | today's world. And this is not only
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| suffered a major loss of credibility at
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| | because if there was individual
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| enormous cost in the wake of its decision
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| | leadership in today's-and precisely in
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| to go to war in Iraq. The challenge of
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| | today's-world, then the military,
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| bringing about an improved relationship
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| | political and economic resources would
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| is still a manageable one. However, if
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| | not suffice. What is even more important
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| the United States is to have a reasonable
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| | is that the model itself is flawed
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| chance at success, it will need to
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| | because at its basis there is and can be
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| understand Russia's concerns with regard
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| | no moral foundations for modern
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| to American unilateralism and make
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| | civilization.
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| appropriate policy changes that limit its
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| | Along with this, what is happening in
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| unilateralism to situations where
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| | today's world...is a tentative to
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| unilateralist approaches are truly
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| | introduce precisely this concept into
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| necessary.
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| | international affairs, the concept of a
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| In the post-Cold War world, fears the
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| | unipolar world.
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| consequences of state failure and
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| | And with which results?
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| instability on its expansive frontier.
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| | Unilateral and frequently illegitimate
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| Clifford Gaddy and Fiona Hill of The
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| | actions have not resolved any problems.
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| Brookings Institution explained, "Given
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| | Moreover they have caused new human
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| its location in a volatile neighborhood
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| | tragedies and created new centers of
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| encompassing Central Asia, the Middle
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| | tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as
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| East and Northeast Asia, and including
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| | well as local and regional conflicts have
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| several states on a potential collision
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| | not diminished...
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| course with the United States-Iraq, Iran,
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| | Today we are witnessing an almost
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| China, and North Korea-Russia is
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| | uncontained hyper use of force-military
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| extremely vulnerable to the unintended
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| | force-in international relations, force
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| consequences of U.S. action. A
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| | that is plunging the world into an abyss
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| unilateralist approach on the part of the
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| | of permanent conflicts. As a result we do
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| United States, Putin believes could prove
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| | not have sufficient strength to find a
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| disastrous for Russia."
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| | comprehensive solution to any one of
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| The still fairly recent and aggressive
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| | these conflicts Finding a political
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| turn to unilateralism by the United
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| | settlement also becomes impossible.
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| States was driven by perceptions of a new
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| | Putin explicitly blamed the United States
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| global reality that followed the end of
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| | for such developments. "One state and, of
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| the Cold War. When the Cold War
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| | course, first and foremost the United
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| concluded, the Soviet Union was in the
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| | States, has overstepped its national
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| last days of its life (soon afterward, it
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| | borders in every way," he charged, "This
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| fractured into a number of economically
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| | is visible in the economic, political,
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| and politically weak successor states).
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| | cultural and educational policies it
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| At that time, the U.S. appeared to have
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| | imposes on other nations." A
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| gained primacy in world affairs,
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| | full-fledged rupture in U.S.-Russia
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| especially in the eyes of an emerging
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| | relations is still avoidable. In fact,
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| Neoconservative school of foreign policy
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| | the relationship can still be repaired
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| thought that was beginning to diverge
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| | fairly easily, as unilateralism, and not
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| from the pragmatic Realism that had
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| | a clash of critical interests between the
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| predominated through the end of the Cold
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| | two nations, is at the root of the
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| War. In their view, a "multipolar" world
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| | worsening relationship. A pragmatic,
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| had been replaced by a "Unipolar" one.
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| | interest-driven U.S. foreign policy that
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| "The center of world power is an
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| | restores primacy to diplomacy, eliminates
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| unchallenged superpower, the United
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| | idealistic "Regime Change," and returns
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| States, attended by its Western allies,"
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| | emphasis to relations between allies and
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| leading Neoconservative thinker Charles
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| | great powers can overturn the
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| Krauthammer wrote. He added, "There is
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| | unilateralism that is currently harming
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| today no lack of second-rank powers.
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| | the relationship. Specifically, such a
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| Germany and Japan are economic dynamos.
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| | policy would entail among the following
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| Britain and France can deploy diplomatic
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| | features:
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| and to some extent military assets. The
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| | - A negotiated energy pact in which the
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| Soviet Union possesses several elements
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| | United States and Russia would ensure
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| of power-military, diplomatic and
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| | cooperation with regard to Central Asia's
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| political-but all are in rapid decline.
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| | energy resources and bring an end to the
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| There is but one first-rate power and no
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| | emerging energy rivalry now evolving. In
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| prospect in the immediate future of any
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| | the partnership, both nations would
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| power to rival it." The Soviet Union,
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| | embrace the principle of open access and
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| according to Krauthammer, had become
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| | collaborate to address issues that might
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| nothing more than a "second-rank" power
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| | arise. Neither would make unilateral
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| and one that was in "rapid decline" to
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| | decisions that would undermine the core
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| boot.
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| | interests of the other.
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| Russia was humiliated. At the same time,
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| | - Full support for Russia's fight against
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| it was constrained by its major weakness.
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| | terrorism in its semi-autonomous Chechen
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| Emboldened by the march of world events,
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| | region and elimination of demands that
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| Neoconservative thinkers believed that
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| | Russia to negotiate with the Chechen
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| the new "Unipolar" world made U.S.
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| | terrorists. Such calls are unreasonable
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| consideration of the major interests of
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| | and have angered Russia's government. In
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| the world's other great powers relatively
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| | the aftermath of the Beslan
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| less important than in it was past. Under
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| | massacre-Russia's 9/11-Putin blasted U.S.
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| such an assumption, they advocated an
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| | calls for negotiations angrily
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| increasingly assertive unilateral
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| | exclaiming, "Why don't you meet Osama Bin
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| approach to U.S. foreign policy toward
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| | Laden, invite him to Brussels or to the
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| creating a safer world.
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| | White House and engage in talks..."
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| In stark contrast, Russia saw
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| | - Full NATO membership and
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| unilateralism as hazardous to
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| | responsibilities and authority within the
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| international peace and security. Today,
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| | relationship that would be commensurate
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| Russia continues to believe that
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| | with its role as a great power. Until
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| single-power hegemony and a unilateralist
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| | that happens, no missiles or missile
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| approach to foreign policy are dangerous
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| | defense systems would be placed in
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| and destabilizing. Consequently, it views
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| | countries that constitute Russia's "Near
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| U.S. unilateralism as posing a threat to
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| | Abroad." The existing NATO guarantee of
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| its critical interests and wellbeing.
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| | collective security would be maintained.
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| Toward that end, Russian President
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| | At the same time, Russia would commit to
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| Vladimir Putin has consistently spoken
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| | working with the U.S. and NATO to help
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| out on those issues. On May 8, 2001, he
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| | mitigate missile threats or, if
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| declared that "claims to world
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| | necessary, help contain the countries
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| domination...still are the cause of many
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| | against which the anti-missile system is
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| wars" and that "these sorts of claims
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| | intended to afford protection.
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| still linger on today and this is very
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| | - A free trade agreement to more closely
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| dangerous." A day later, he added, "Our
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| | integrate Russia into the global and
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| entire post-war [post-World War II]
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| | western economies. Such a mutually
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| history teaches us that no country can
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| | beneficial interdependence could mitigate
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| build a safer world for itself alone, and
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| | Russian "counterbalancing."
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| even more so, cannot build its security
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| | - Restoration of a military doctrine of
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| to the detriment of others."
| |
| | pre-emption as opposed to proactive war.
|
| Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a
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| | Proactive war, particularly in the
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| wholly Neoconservative approach to
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| | absence of a credible and imminent threat
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| foreign policy blossomed in the U.S.
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| | to nation's critical interests,
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| Unilateralism became arguably the major
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| | undermines respect for the norms of
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| means by which the U.S. conducted its
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| | international law and increases
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| relations with the international
| |
| | instability in the region in which such
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| community. "Regime Change" replaced
| |
| | conflicts occur. Application of military
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| "Containment" and "proactive war"
| |
| | force before diplomacy has been exhausted
|
| replaced "pre-emption." In June 2002, the
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| | makes it more difficult for nation's to
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| U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. In
| |
| | achieve differences in the diplomatic
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| March 2003, it invaded Iraq in the face
| |
| | arena, as countries would more than
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| of strong Russian opposition and in the
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| | likely focus on deterring an attack that
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| absence of a United Nations Security
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| | could occur before meaningful
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| Council resolution. Currently, it is
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| | negotiations had a chance to find
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| pursuing plans to place 10 missile
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| | agreement.
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| interceptors in Poland and a radar system
| |
| | None of these policies would compromise
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| in the Czech Republic to construct a
| |
| | critical U.S. interests. None of these
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| limited missile defense shield against
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| | policies would harm to U.S. national
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| countries such as Iran. Russian alarm
| |
| | security. Instead, they would create a
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| grew.
| |
| | post-unilateralist framework under which
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| On February 10, 2007, President Putin
| |
| | the geopolitically important U.S.-Russia
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| made a seminal speech that detailed his
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| | relationship could be renewed and
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| objections to the Neoconservatives'
| |
| | improved. Such a development would be
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| "Unipolar" vision and U.S.
| |
| | mutually-beneficial to both countries and
|
| uniltateralism. Excerpts from Putin's
| |
| | could, over time, be a force for
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| speech at the Munich Conference on
| |
| | increased stability in parts of the world
|
| Security Policy detail his views and
| |
| | where stability is currently difficult to
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| follow:
| |
| | achieve.
|